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.100/nyc/rcny/title24_81_08.asp [hereinafter R.C.N.Y.].
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stated that
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(2008), available at http://24.97.137.100/nyc/charter/entered.htm; id. § 1043.
3 See N.Y. Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
4 Citizens of Philadelphia, California, Boston, and Montgomery County, Maryland, juris-
dictions which have subsequently followed New York City’s lead or are in the process of
doing so, are also restricted by trans-fat bans.
5 Marcia Gelbert, Bakers Frosted By Trans Fat Ban, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 1, 2007, at B7.
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FINDLAW, June 29, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20080729.html.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2006, New York City passed a ban on using artificial trans-fats in
all New York City restaurants.1  The City authorized this action based on New York
City Charter sections 558 and 1043.2  New York City legislators and trans-fat critics
favored the ban based on its professed purpose—to cut down on heart-disease- related
deaths.3  The New York City trans-fat ban, however, unfairly restricts the rights of the
citizens of New York City who enjoy eating foods with trans-fats,4 and restaurateurs
whose livelihoods are dependant on producing tasty food in an economical fashion.
This Note will analyze the constitutionality of the New York City trans-fat ban
and similar bans that have been introduced or proposed in Philadelphia,5 California,6
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7 Boston Public Health Comm’n, A Regulation to Restrict Foods Containing Artificial
Trans Fat in the City of Boston (2008), available at www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/regulations/
Forms%20%20Documents/regs_transfat-Mar08.pdf.
8 Miranda S. Spivack, Montgomery Bans Trans Fats in Restaurants, Markets, WASH.
POST, May 16, 2007, at A1.
9 New York City’s trans-fat ban may run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Municipalities are permitted to enact laws and regulations pursuant
to their police powers, or “the ability of state and local governments to regulate for the health,
safety, and welfare of a community.” Jackson S. Davis, Note, Fast Food, Zoning, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause: Was It Something I Ate?, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 259, 260
(2008). The dormant Commerce Clause functions to prevent state and local governments from
hindering interstate commerce through heavy-handed exercises of their police powers. Id.
The clause arose due to forms of economic protectionism employed by the states under
the Articles of Confederation. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,
91 YALE L.J. 425, 430 (1982). At that time, Congress had no authority with which to regulate
interstate commerce, and states enacted various tariff regimes against one another, hindering
economic development and fostering conflict. Elizabeth Young Spivey, Trans Fat: Can New
York City Save Its Citizens From This “Metabolic Poison,” 42 GA. L. REV. 273, 295 (2007).
Recognizing these behaviors as counterproductive, the Founding Fathers sought to curtail
such economic gamesmanship post-Articles of Confederation by creating “a national union
‘indivisible through an energetic and common pursuit of commerce.’” Id. at 295–96.
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, if a state or municipal law is found to be “facially
discriminat[ory], discriminatory in purpose, or has intolerable effects on interstate commerce,”
then it may be struck down as unconstitutional. Id. at 296. Though the New York trans-fat ban
only applies to restaurants located in the City, “the law is still subject to examination under
the Commerce Clause.” Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
To analyze the New York trans-fat ban under the dormant Commerce Clause, the actions
of the City must first be found either facially discriminatory, discriminatory in purpose or having
a discriminatory effect upon interstate commerce, similar to the analysis given to a federal
action. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Spivey, supra, at 295. Laws that are facially discrimi-
natory are clearly prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause. See City of Philadelphia v.
Boston,7 and Montgomery County, Maryland.8  First, a scientific discussion explain-
ing what trans-fats are and the health risks they pose.  Second, this Note will discuss
the appropriate level of due process scrutiny that should be applied to the New York
City trans-fat ban.  In order to determine the level of scrutiny the ban should receive
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, this Note will compare the dangers of
trans-fats to the interests and dangers considered in other prominent substantive due
process cases.  Next, this Note will argue that the New York City trans-fat ban, en-
acted in December 2006, violates the constitutional rights of restaurateurs and restau-
rant patrons in New York City.  The trans-fat ban decimates natural law theories of
autonomy and self-determination, and is likewise violative of the substantive due pro-
cess rights of New Yorkers as it improperly abridges their right to make decisions re-
garding their health and diet.  Finally, trans-fat bans also pose constitutional difficulties
under the Takings Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.  These constitutional
arguments will be evaluated as well.9
2010] OF FAT PEOPLE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 859
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (explaining that “where simple economic protectionism
is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected”). Deter-
mining whether a state or local law is facially discriminatory is a simple, facial analysis—
simply put, if a state or municipality enacts a law that clearly discriminates against out-of-state
companies or products in interstate commerce, it is a facial violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. See id. at 625–28. New York City’s ban is not facially discriminatory, as it bans restau-
rants from serving trans-fats regardless of their headquarters or the origin of the trans-fats served.
Similarly, any argument that the trans-fat ban is discriminatory in purpose can be easily
dispensed with. The trans-fat ban does not impede out-of-state trans-fat producers, distributors
or users in a different manner, or to a greater extent than intra-city users. See  R.C.N.Y., tit. 24
§ 81.08 (2007), available at http://24.97.137.100/nyc/rcny/title24_81_08.asp. By way of illus-
tration, Patsy’s Pizzeria, located solely in Manhattan, cannot serve artificial trans-fats any more
than McDonald’s, headquartered in Illinois. (In the estimation of this author, Patsy’s is the
greatest pizzeria in New York, serving authentic, thin-crust pizza, generously garnished with
fresh basil. Civil Procedure geeks may be familiar with Patsy’s not for their delicious pizzas
and ricotta calzones, but rather for the infamous Rule 11 sanctions case involving the beloved
pizzeria. See Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209 (2003) (awarding over
$250,000 in attorney’s fees due to fraudulent filings in Lanham Act claim and leveling nearly
$100,000 in sanctions against the defendant’s attorney Frank Brija)).
As for discriminatory effect, courts have generally found it where laws “‘so closely parallel
statutes that concededly violate the Constitution that those laws are likewise subject to judicial
invalidation.’” Spivey, supra, at 297 (quoting DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE 231 (2004)). The trans-fat ban arguably has a discriminatory effect on out-
of-state businesses because it damages profit margins for national food companies by raising
costs for out-of-state businesses active in the New York City food industry. National restaurants
and food distributors typically prepare food in a central location, then ship the prepared foods
for final cooking to franchises throughout the country. Id. at 299–300. French fries, for ex-
ample, are blanched and fried by food processing companies before being frozen and shipped
to restaurants, where they are fried a second time. Id. at 299. These french fries are prepared
at processing plants in unimaginably large batches—the frying vats can hold up to 25,000
pounds of oil. Id. For out-of-state manufacturers making french fries for national consumption,
switching over to trans-fat free oil in order to accommodate a single city would be a costly
endeavor. Such a switch would likely include a complete transition in fryer technology and
oil choice, or building a separate frying vat to accommodate municipalities requiring trans-fat
free products. Id. at 299–300.
A full legal analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause and trans-fat ban is beyond the
scope of this Note, and would require a tedious walk through the unsettled minefield of dormant
Commerce Clause and Pike test scholarship. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970). The Pike test is employed when “a law indirectly affects interstate commerce
and regulates evenhandedly  . . . [in which case] the court . . . examine[s] whether the State’s
interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the puta-
tive local benefits.” Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F.Supp.2d 891, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). While the Supreme Court has used the Pike test in analyzing
appropriate dormant Commerce Clause issues, other courts have declined to employ it, leading
to great unrest and confusion in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. For those desiring
a more exhaustive treatment of the dormant Commerce Clause issues presented by New York
City’s trans-fat ban, Jennifer Young Spivey’s note on trans-fat regulations and the dormant
Commerce Clause is both thorough and insightful. See Spivey, supra.
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10 Carmen Filosa, Trans Fat Bans: The Next Regulatory Taking?, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 99,
100 (2008).
11 American Heart Association, Trans Fats, http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml
?identifier=3045792 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter American Heart Association].
12 See id.; Mayo Clinic, Trans Fat is Double Trouble for Your Heart Health, http://www
.mayoclinic.com/health/trans-fat/CL00032 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Mayo
Clinic].
13 American Heart Association, supra note 11.
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., American Heart Association, supra note 11 (explaining that trans-fats affect
the way the body processes cholesterol and make individuals more susceptible to cholesterol
issues, heart disease, stroke and type two diabetes); Mayo Clinic, supra note 12 (warning that
“[a] high LDL cholesterol level in combination with a low HDL cholesterol level increases your
risk of heart disease, the leading killer of men and women”).
16 Filosa, supra note 10, at 100.
17 See Susan Okie, New York to Trans Fats: You’re Out!, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2017,
2018 (2007).
I. THE HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE MOTIVATIONS OF TRANS-FAT BANS IN THE
UNITED STATES
In order to appreciate the legislative motivations and history underlying the New
York City trans-fat ban, it is important to understand what trans-fats are and the health
risks they pose.  This section will explain what trans-fats are, where trans-fats come
from, and the effects trans-fats have on the health and diet of Americans.  This section
will also discuss the history of trans-fat regulations in the United States, both from
administrative agencies like the Food and Drug Administration and, more recently,
from individual organizations, states, and municipalities.
A. What Is Trans-Fat and Where Does It Come From?
A “[t]rans fat is a common name for a type of unsaturated fat with trans isomer
fatty acid(s).”10  Trans-fats, otherwise known as “partially hydrogenated oils,” are
created in an industrial process that adds hydrogen to liquid vegetable oils to make
them more solid.11  Hydrogenation makes oils and fats more solid,12 increases their
shelf life, and maintains the flavor and texture of foods containing such fats.13  Trans-
fats are relatively inexpensive, improve the texture of foods fried in them, can be used
for a long time in commercial fryers, and increase the shelf life and flavor of foods.14
While there are a multitude of practical, economic, and culinary benefits unique to
trans-fats, they are also decidedly not “heart healthy.”15
The vast majority of trans-fats are artificially produced through hydrogenation
processes;16 however, some trans-fats are found naturally in foods such as dairy
products and red meats.17
2010] OF FAT PEOPLE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 861
18 See id. at 2017; see also N.Y. Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that heart
disease is the leading cause of death in New York City, accounting for 23,000 deaths in 2004).
19 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Revealing Trans Fats, 37 FDA CONSUMER MAG.,
Sept.–Oct. 2003, http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/food/reveal-fats/reveal-fats.htm.
20 Filosa, supra note 10, at 100–01.
21 American Heart Association, supra note 11.
22 Mayo Clinic, supra note 12.
23 Id.
24 See id.; see also American Heart Association, supra note 11; U.S. Food & Drug
Administration, supra note 19.
25 See Mayo Clinic, supra note 12. Triglycerides are a particular type of fat present in the
bloodstream. Like HDL cholesterol, triglycerides may “contribute to hardening of the arteries
(atherosclerosis) or thickening of the artery walls .” Id.
26 Id. (“Trans fat appears to damage the cells lining blood vessels, leading to [increased]
inflammation” when the body sustains an injury.).
27 See id.; American Heart Association, supra note 11; U.S. Food & Drug Administration,
supra note 19.
28 Filosa, supra note 10, at 101.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
B. The Impact Trans-Fats Have On Health
Trans-fats are among the most damaging kinds of fat found in the American diet.18
Trans-fats affect the balance of low-density lipoproteins (LDL cholesterol) and high-
density lipoproteins (HDL cholesterol) in the body.19  Scientific studies show that
“consumption of saturated fat, trans fat, and dietary cholesterol raises low-density lipo-
protein (LDL), or ‘bad cholesterol,’ levels”20 while simultaneously “lower[ing] . . .
good (HDL) cholesterol levels.”21  The effects trans-fats have on cholesterol levels are
particularly troubling because LDL (bad cholesterol) “transports cholesterol through-
out [the] body . . . [and] when elevated, builds up in the walls of [the] arteries, making
them hard and narrow.”22  HDL, or “good cholesterol,” “picks up excess cholesterol
and takes it back to [the] liver.”23  Simply put, trans-fats add hardening cholesterols
into the blood stream and suppress the production of cleaning cholesterols that bal-
ance out their hardening counterparts.24  According to the Mayo Clinic, trans-fats also
increase triglyceride25 and inflammation levels.26
The impact that trans-fats have on the production of HDL and LDL cholesterol,
triglycerides and inflammation affects the heart and overall health of those who eat
trans-fats.27  A high LDL level “can cause atherosclerosis, a dangerous accumulation
of fatty deposits on the walls of the arteries.”28  Such deposits “can reduce blood flow
through the arteries.”29  Atherosclerosis can be especially dangerous if the arteries in
the chest or abdomen are affected.30  In such cases, the deposits can result in “chest pain
and other symptoms of coronary artery disease.”31  Further, if the hardened “deposits
tear or rupture, a blood clot may form and block the flow of blood or break free and
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32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Trans-fats have been bemoaned on television, through print media, and on dedicated
anti-trans-fat websites, such as BanTransFats.com. See, e.g., JUDITH SHAW, TRANS FATS:
THE HIDDEN KILLER IN OUR FOOD (2004); Ban Trans-Fats: The Campaign To Ban Partially
Hydrogenated Oils, http://www.bantransfats.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
36 SHAW, supra note 35, at 102.
37 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–.106 (2006).
38 Filosa, supra note 10, at 102 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101).
39 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–.106.
40 See id.
41 See Filosa, supra note 10, at 102.
42 “For nutritional purposes, the public schools shall not (i) use cooking oils in their
school food programs that contain trans-fatty acids or (ii) sell processed foods containing
trans-fatty acids that were formed during the commercial processing of the foods.” N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-264(b) (West 2007).
43 Id.
plunge an artery downstream.”32  This in turn could cause the blood flow to the heart
to stop, in which case a heart attack will occur.33  Likewise, if there is a restriction of
the blood flow to the brain, then there is a heightened risk of suffering from a stroke.34
C. Development of Trans-Fat Regulations and Legislation
The health risks associated with trans-fat consumption have garnered great
attention and public concern.35  As a result of this widespread public concern, gov-
ernments, at several levels, decided to take active steps to regulate and decrease the
consumption of foods containing trans-fats.36
In 2006, the Food and Drug Administration [FDA] passed regulations requiring
that the level of artificial trans-fats in food products be displayed on the nutritional
information label.37  All foods sold in grocery stores must conform to the FDA’s trans-
fat regulations.38  Functionally speaking, the FDA’s regulations on artificial trans-fats
neither ban nor reduce the amount of trans-fats present in grocery store food.39  Rather,
the FDA regulations simply serve to make consumers aware of what they are eating.40
The choice is left to food producers, grocers and consumers as to whether they will
choose to eat foods containing trans-fats or opt for healthier alternatives.
Unlike their federal counterparts, certain states and municipalities have begun
to regulate artificial trans-fats at a local level, employing increasingly paternalistic
and oppressive tactics to get the pro-health message to the forefront of the American
consciousness.41  North Carolina, for example, helped set in motion the wave of local
trans-fat regulations currently sweeping the nation.42  In 2005, North Carolina banned
the use of artificial trans-fats in public school meals.43  Though the North Carolina ban
garnered little attention, it opened the door to increased trans-fat regulation and paved
the way for broader bans, such as the one adopted by New York City.
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44 See Charisse Jones & Nanci Hellmich, NYC Bans Trans Fats In Restaurants, USA
TODAY, Dec. 6, 2006, at 1A; Thomas J. Lucek & Kim Severson, New York Bans Most Trans
Fats In Restaurants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1.
45 Gelbert, supra note 5.
46 Dorf, supra note 6.
47 Boston Public Health Comm’n, supra note 7.
48 Spivack, supra note 8.
49 See R.C.N.Y., tit. 24 § 81.08 (2007).
50 The New York City Board of Health and Mental Hygiene stated that over 23,000 New
Yorkers die every year from heart disease, and thus trans-fat in restaurant food in New York
“represents an important contribution to cardiovascular risk for New York City diners.” N.Y.
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
51 Id. (“By restricting [restaurants] from serving food that contains artificial trans fat . . .
we can reduce New Yorkers’ exposure to an avoidable [health] hazard . . . .”).
52 Filosa, supra note 10, at 103 (“In October of 2006, the fast food chain KFC announced
that it was banning all of its United States restaurants from using trans fat in its chicken. KFC’s
system-wide rollout was completed by April 2007. KFC is not the only restaurant . . . .
Wendy’s, . . . Burger King [and] McDonald’s” have all taken steps or fully implemented a
trans-fat free cooking scheme.”).
53 See, e.g., Bruce Horowitz, KFC Plans ‘Important’ Trans Fat ‘Milestone,’ USA TODAY,
Oct. 30, 2006, at 1B.
54 It should be noted that many national chains made the decision to go trans-fat free nation-
wide after New York City announced the trans-fat ban. Filosa, supra note 10, at 102. Kentucky
Fried Chicken, Wendy’s, and Burger King, for example, all chose to adopt use of trans-fat free
oils nationwide. Id. Industry analysts suggested that the nationwide switch was necessary
because New York City represented such a large portion of food sales. Id. It would have been
economically inefficient to transition New York City over on its own—especially when other
cities were likely to follow in their footsteps.
Next, in 2006, New York City passed the first high-profile trans-fat regula-
tion—a ban on artificial trans-fats in all New York City restaurants.44  Since then,
Philadelphia,45 California,46 Boston,47 and most recently Montgomery County,
Maryland,48 have enacted or proposed artificial trans-fat bans.
The New York City trans-fat ban disallowed restaurants from serving dishes
with more than one-half of a gram of artificial trans-fat.49  The City’s motivation50
was to drastically reduce New Yorkers’ intake of trans-fats, set an example for other
municipalities, and improve the health of New York City residents.51  Some chain res-
taurants saw the “french fries on the trees” and changed their cooking methods to
omit trans-fats ahead of the 2006 ban.52  National fast food chains were particularly
responsive to the New York City ban.53  Fast food chains such as Kentucky Fried
Chicken eliminated trans-fats from their restaurants nationwide in response to the
proposed New York City ban.54
If the purpose of trans-fat regulation is simply to promote a healthier dietary
pattern and lifestyle for Americans, it is unclear whether the let-do federal approach
or the more stringent approach adopted by New York City will be more effective.
What is clear, however, is that the paternalistic ban in New York City potentially
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55 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
56 See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006) (examining the highest level
of review—strict scrutiny).
57 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–48 (1992) (“It
is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
may not enter.”). The majority in Casey went on to explain in a most synthesized and eloquent
fashion that
liberty is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking
of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion . . . and so on.
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . .
and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment
must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the
state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Id. at 848 (emphasis added) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
58 See generally Winkler, supra note 56 (analyzing the rise of strict scrutiny and its
supposed “fatal” quality to any statute subjected to it).
59 See id. at 799.
runs afoul of the due process rights of New York City residents and restaurateurs.
The New York City trans-fat ban also poses Takings Clause and dormant Commerce
Clause issues that will be plumbed in this Note.  While scientific evidence and common
sense both suggest that Americans should eat healthily and reduce the amount of trans-
fats in their diet, it is inappropriate for government at any level to make, unilaterally
and with an iron fist, health-related decisions for its citizens.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE ANALYSIS
A. Assessing the Proper Level of Due Process Scrutiny for Consumers and
Purveyors of Trans-Fats
The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .”55  Such cases are evaluated using the
framework of Due Process Clause jurisprudence and are divided up based on levels
of scrutiny.56  Existing case law and prevailing jurisprudence guide judges in determin-
ing how strictly they will guard the principle or right in question.  Historically, cases
that deal with the right to privacy and other constitutionally-guaranteed, fundamental
rights have been evaluated by courts under the framework of strict scrutiny.57  This is
the highest level of protection that a court can afford a due process case.58  Rights that
are not expressly provided for in the Constitution and rights that do not rise to the
level of “liberty interests” are given lesser forms of scrutiny—namely intermediate
tier scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny.59
At the heart of the argument against an all-out trans-fat ban is the notion that
Americans are entitled to make decisions for themselves.  This notion holds especially
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60 See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
62 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (discussing an employee’s or
employer’s right to contract to work sixty hours or more per week in a bakery), with Roe, 410
U.S. at 164 (ruling on the right of a woman and her physician to choose whether to have an
abortion, subject to certain state imposed limitations).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
64 See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)
(explaining that rational basis review is the standard used in economic Due Process Clause
analyses because courts want to defer to the legislature as to economic and business relations
enacted). In Williamson, the Court held that if there was a legitimate interest that the legislature
might have intended to remedy using the means they did, then those means satisfied the rational
basis review. Id. at 489.
65 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion) (explain-
ing that due process “‘is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.’” (quoting Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
66 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–54 (holding that economic due process arguments
are evaluated under a rational basis theory).
true when the decisions in question relate to the right of individuals to make decisions
about their health.  The Supreme Court has applied the framework of strict scrutiny to
several health-related rights, including the right to an abortion.60  Health-related rights
are generally considered to be part of the bundle of privacy rights that are given strict
scrutiny in the Due Process Clause context, in the interest of protecting the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ever-evolving “realm of personal liberty.”61
Residents of New York City who frequent restaurants that are no longer allowed
to use trans-fats have a substantive Due Process Clause claim related to a noneco-
nomic right.62  Arguably, citizens of New York City have a privacy right to make their
own health-related decisions, including what healthy and unhealthy foods they eat.
Restaurateurs affected by the ban, however, have a due process argument arising
in an economic due process context.63  New York restaurateurs might argue that New
York City has required an action of them that violates their best economic interests.
Here, restaurant owners are not complaining that their personal rights or liberty inter-
ests have been infringed, but rather that their economic interests have been frustrated.
Economic due process rights are evaluated using rational basis review, the least
exacting due process standard available.64
B. Economic Due Process Clause Analysis Under Carolene Products
The Due Process Clause protects the substantive and procedural rights of indi-
viduals against governmental abuses and intrusions.65  Due process jurisprudence
has developed such that economic rights are given a less rigorous analytical treatment
than other liberty interests and rights.66  In the famous case, United States v. Carolene
Products, the Supreme Court laid out the framework for economic, rational basis
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67 Id. at 154 (“[W]here the legislative judgment is drawn in question, [courts] must be
restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be
assumed affords support for it.”).
68 Id. at 146.
69 Id. at 145–46.
70 Id. at 147.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 422 (Conn. 2008).
72 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 147 (“Hence Congress is free to exclude from inter-
state commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may reasonably
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare .”).
73 See N.Y. Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
74 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 147.
75 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, supra note 19.
76 Mayo Clinic, supra note 12.
77 Id.
78 Id.
review.67  Carolene Products presented facts quite similar to those in the trans-fat ban.
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause,68 Congress passed the Filled Milk Act, prohibiting
the “shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or
oil other than milk fat.”69  The Court reasoned that they should not overturn economic
legislation unless there is no possible set of facts that support a government’s rationale
for a questioned piece of legislation.70  Exercising deference to the legislature when
dealing with economic due process cases has become standard practice post-Carolene
Products,71 and economic regulations will not be overturned on due process grounds
unless no possible set of facts could support an underlying legislative rationale.72
The next section will briefly discuss a potential economic due process claim
brought by New York City restaurateurs.  Operating under the analytical framework
of Carolene Products, it is clear that New York restaurateurs would not have a tenable
due process claim arising out of the trans-fat ban.
C. Application of Economic Due Process Analysis to New York City
Restaurateurs
The New York City trans-fat ban was enacted to help reduce the consumption
of trans-fats by New Yorkers, thereby reducing heart-disease-related illnesses and
deaths.73  Operating under the framework of Carolene Products, courts should defer
to the New York City Board of Health unless they find no possible set of facts or
circumstances that would support the rationale underlying the trans-fat ban.74
One need not look hard to find factual, scientific evidence in support of the
trans-fat ban’s legislative motivation.  Trans-fats affect the balance of low-density
lipoproteins (LDL cholesterol) and high-density lipoproteins (HDL cholesterol) in the
body,75 potentially leading to increased build-up of hardened cholesterol deposits in
the arteries.76  Such deposits can reduce blood flow through the arteries,77 and may
lead to a heart attack or stroke.78
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Based on the opinions of the American Heart Association, the Food and Drug
Administration and the Mayo Clinic, a court could easily find that trans-fats pose
health risks to those consuming them.79  Operating then under the standard laid out in
Carolene Products,80 courts would likely decline to overturn the trans-fat ban based on
an alleged infringement of the substantive, economic due process rights of New York
City restaurateurs.  This outcome is particularly likely in light of the factual similarities
between the trans-fat ban and the Filled Milk Act considered in Carolene Products.81
III. A NEW YORK CITY RESIDENT’S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM
A. Generally
Due Process Clause jurisprudence has come to embrace the notion that “cases
suggest . . . specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights” and that those guarantees “have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.”82  Found in these “penumbras” are many due process rights,83 including
the “right of personal privacy . . . or zones of privacy,”84 in health-related matters such
as abortion and refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment.85
Courts have recognized that a “substantive-due-process analysis has two pri-
mary features.”86  First, courts look to see if the state has allegedly impinged upon
a fundamental right or liberty interest “deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history and
tradition[s].”87  Next, courts ask for a “careful description” of the fundamental liberty
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88 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277–78
(concluding that the magnitude of fundamental rights warrants specifics instead of a general
statement).
89 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
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interest called into question.88  In evaluating whether the right impinged upon truly
rises to the level of a fundamental liberty interest, courts look to our nation’s history,
legal traditions, and practices as “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking.”89
If a court determines that the right called into question is truly fundamental so as
to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” then any alleged violation of that
right will be evaluated using the strict scrutiny standard.90  The strict scrutiny standard
requires that “[w]here certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved . . . regulation[s]
limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake.”91  Non-fundamental rights are subjected to intermediate or rational
basis scrutiny.92
B. Level of Due Process Scrutiny To Be Applied
The right to eat foods containing trans-fats, if so stated, is admittedly not a
fundamental constitutional guarantee deserving strict scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause.  However, to cast the right impinged upon by the City of New York in such
a narrow fashion would be a dangerous and inattentive treatment.  What New York
City has done is place limitations on the rights of its citizens to make decisions related
to their health.  New York City has substituted the judgment of its residents with legis-
lative fiat, stripping citizens of their ability to choose whether to eat foods that might
have a negative impact on their health.  Put differently, New Yorkers can no longer
inform themselves of the dangers of eating trans-fats and decide whether or not to in-
dulge in restaurant foods containing trans-fats.  Rather, New York City has decided
for its citizens that trans-fats in restaurants pose distinct health risks and should there-
fore be unavailable to the public.  The right to make such health-related decisions has
been the subject of many cases, most notably the abortion line of due process cases,93
in which the right to make health-related decisions was held to rise to the level of a
fundamental right.94
On a common sense level, the analogy between the health-related rights central
to abortion cases (the right to make the decision to have an abortion free from
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government intervention) and the health-related right raised by the trans-fat ban (the
right to make dietary decisions free from government intervention) is fairly instinctive.95
Framing this argument, however, in the context of the Due Process Clause is a slightly
more challenging needle to thread.
Following the example of the Supreme Court, this section looks to our nation’s
history, legal traditions, and practices as “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking.”96
What such an exploration makes clear is a long-standing jurisprudential pattern of pro-
tecting society’s right to make health-related decisions and, similarly, a tradition of
issuing purely advisory regulations pertaining to food choices.97  Both of these fac-
tors suggest that the right to make health-related decisions is already identified as a
fundamental right, deeply rooted in American traditions and deserving of the strictest
scrutiny afforded by due process.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court stated that the “right of privacy . . . is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”98  The
Court then went on to discuss the various “detriment[s] that the State would impose
upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice,”99 including medical risks and
complications, distress to the mother, psychological harm to the mother and to the
child.100  In its conclusion, the Roe Court stated that “the attending physician, in con-
sultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in
his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.  If that decision
is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by
the State.”101  The language of the Roe opinion makes clear that the Supreme Court
attended to the right to have an abortion, and the scope of such a right, as a health-
related, medical decision.  Though the Court attached certain limitations to the right
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to have an abortion, it held that the right to privacy extended to this controversial med-
ical procedure.102  The same right of privacy would inferentially extend to the right
to make dietary choices under a privacy rationale.  Both abortion and dietary rights
are, at their core, health-related;103 so if the solemn, profound decision to abort a fetus
is shaded beneath the due process penumbra, surely the occasional, (and dare I say)
unimportant, decision to eat Kentucky Fried Chicken, containing trans-fats, is shielded
from the abrasive sunlight of government intrusion as well.
Additional support exists for the notion of a fundamental right to make health-
related decisions.104  As in Roe, the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg and Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health cast both holdings in terms of health-related
rights retained by individuals as against the State.105  In Washington v. Glucksberg, the
Court was forced to examine the outer limits of what the right of privacy and the Due
Process Clause protect.106  The Supreme Court declined in Glucksberg to acknowl-
edge a so-called “right to die” protected by the Due Process Clause and the right of
privacy.107  The Glucksberg Court rejected the argument that the right to die was the
natural extension of prior decisions, namely Cruzan, regarding knowing refusal of life-
sustaining medical treatment.108  Importantly, though, the Court reaffirmed its earlier
holdings in cases dealing with refusal of life-sustaining measures “recognizing a
liberty interest that includes the refusal of artificial provision of life-sustaining food
and water.”109
The decision to refuse life-sustaining measures is unarguably a health-related right.
In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court explained that the “[c]onstitutional recognition of
the right to bodily integrity underlies the assumed right . . . to require physicians to
terminate artificial life support.”110  It is that same interest in one’s bodily integrity
and autonomy that calls into question the propriety of the trans-fat ban.  The Cruzan
decision protects the right of individuals to refuse life-sustaining medical care, a
health-related decision of the utmost gravity.111  Further, the Supreme Court held
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that the decision to refuse life-sustaining measures, a decision inherently medical in
nature and inevitably fatal by design, was a fundamental right.112  Surely protecting
an individual’s right to make poor, but by no means fatal, health-related decisions is
a protection subsumed into such marquee due process cases regarding medical deci-
sions.  This conclusion seems especially tenable given that the same fundamental right
to autonomy and bodily integrity in making medical decisions underlies Glucksberg,
Cruzan and the right to make dietary decisions.
C. Application
If the ability to make dietary choices is a health-related right sheltered by the
notions of privacy, “bodily integrity” and personal autonomy inherent in the Due
Process Clause,113 then the New York City trans-fat ban must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny.114  This Note has already identified the fundamental right infringed upon
by the trans-fat ban (the ability to make one’s own health-related decisions) and the
government’s rationale underlying the trans-fat ban (to reduce heart-disease- related
deaths).115  Now, using the construct of strict scrutiny, this section will evaluate whether
New York City’s trans-fat ban violates the due process rights of New Yorkers.  Two
factors must be analyzed, namely, the gravity of the City’s interest in passing the trans-
fat ban and the tailoring of the trans-fat ban.116  If the right to make dietary decisions is
a health-related privacy right, then it is considered a fundamental liberty interest, and
the government’s interest in abridging that right must be compelling and narrowly
tailored, such that no less restrictive means were available.117
One can only surmise how a court might characterize the level of governmental
interest presented in the trans-fat ban.  Using due process parlance, there are two
options available—legitimate118 and compelling.119  There is no bright line rule used
in determining whether an interest is legitimate or compelling, so this section will
address the level of New York City’s interest in improving heart health by way of
comparison to other leading cases.
872 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:857
120 Id. at 154.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 150 (“The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any
other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for
the patient.”).
123 Id. at 154.
124 Id. at 163.
125 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 729–30 (1997).
126 Id. at 729.
127 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–11, 720; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–85 (1990).
128 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
129 N.Y. Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 1–2.
130 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
131 Id.
132 See N.Y. Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “a State may properly assert important
interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting
potential life.”120  Safeguarding health and maintaining safe medical procedures are
compelling state interests under Roe.121  Within Roe, the Court also identified the ability
for individuals to have a safe abortion as a legitimate state interest.122  So, on the one
hand, the State has a compelling interest to provide safe medical procedures, maintain
medical standards and safeguard its people’s health.123  The State’s interest in regulat-
ing abortion to ensure safety, however, is couched in terms of legitimate interests.124
Government was also held to have a legitimate interest in discouraging suicide.125
In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held that Washington’s ban on assisted suicide was
rationally related to the State’s interest in discouraging suicide, a legitimate inter-
est.126  In Glucksberg, the Court relied largely on the holding of Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.127 In pertinent part, the Cruzan Court held that the
State has a legitimate interest in the “protection and preservation of human life” as
it applied to the informed refusal of life-sustaining medical procedures.128
In the present case, New York City asserts that it has an interest in preventing
heart disease and improving the health of its citizens.129  New York City’s interest
sounds most similar to the state interests asserted in Roe and in Cruzan due to their
shared underlying themes of autonomy in making health-related decisions.  New York
City’s motivation to help police and protect its citizens’ health is virtually identical
to the state’s professed purpose in Roe, wherein the State also asserted its interest in
“safeguarding health.”130  In Roe, the Court recognized the State’s interest in safe-
guarding the health of its people and helping to maintain medical standards as a com-
pelling interest.131  This is a virtually identical rationale to that justifying the New
York City trans-fat ban.132
On one hand, the language used to justify the trans-fat ban is closely analogous to
that used in Roe.  On the other hand, Roe dealt with a particular medical procedure—a
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more contained and specific health-related activity than dietary choices at large.133
Still, a court might find that New York City’s interest in safeguarding the health of its
citizens is similar to the health-related rights considered compelling in Roe as, in fact,
both governmental interests are simply safeguarding the health of citizens.  A court,
however, might determine, due to the lesser immediacy of the trans-fat ban’s health
impact, that the governmental interest asserted therein is not as pressing as those
addressed in Roe.  In that case, a court would find the governmental interest most
analogous to those governmental interests asserted in Cruzan and Glucksberg.  Were
this the case, the New York ban would fail strict scrutiny due to the lacking gravity
of the governmental interest asserted (assuming, of course, that the court held the
right to make dietary, health-related decisions a fundamental right).
Even if the City of New York’s interest could be construed as a compelling govern-
mental interest that would stand up to the rigors of strict scrutiny, the poorly tailored
fit of the trans-fat ban calls its legitimacy into question.  When a fundamental right has
been called into question on due process grounds courts have generally held “that the
Due Process Clause prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”134
A state or municipality can narrowly tailor its restriction by “pursuing . . . [a] govern-
mental interest in a manner narrowly tailored to minimize the restraint on liberty.”135
Proper tailoring is important because it reduces “the problem of overinclusiveness136
[or underinclusiveness137], along with the attendant risk that an overbroad statute
will be applied in an undesirable discriminatory fashion.”138
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The New York City trans-fat ban applies only to “food service establish-
ment[s] . . .[and] mobile food unit commissar[ies].”139  The ban does not extend to
grocery stores, wholesalers or “food that is being served directly to patrons in a manu-
facturer’s original sealed package.”140  Additionally, the ban only applies to artificial
trans-fats, not to naturally occurring trans-fats.141  Trans-fats occurring naturally in
dairy products and in red meats142 are not subject to the ban.143
Since the City Health Department’s stated purpose in enacting the trans-fat ban was
to reduce heart-disease-related deaths and improve the heart health of New Yorkers,144
the fact that the trans-fat ban has such a narrow purview suggests that the regulation
may be underinclusive.145  To begin, the ban only applies to artificial trans-fats, esti-
mated to account for 80% of dietary trans-fats.146  From the start then, the trans-fat ban
applies only to four-fifths of trans-fats.  More startling is the fact that, by New York
City’s own research, restaurant foods only account for, at most, one-third of the cal-
ories in the diet of the average American.147  The trans-fat ban only applies to the 33%
of foods purchased in restaurants, not to the 67% of foods purchased in grocery stores
and through wholesalers.148  The fact that naturally occurring trans-fats, grocery store
products, and products served in restaurants but labeled in their original packaging, are
not included in the ban,149 means that the vast majority of trans-fats are not regulated
by the ban.  Only a certain specific group (restaurants and vendors) are covered by
the ban.  This failure to include such a large portion of the trans-fats available on the
market suggests that the trans-fat ban is very poorly tailored.  Consequently, even if
a court construed New York City’s governmental interest in enacting the trans-fat ban
to be compelling, the ban would fail the analytical framework of strict scrutiny due
to its poor fit.
IV. REGULATORY TAKINGS ISSUE POSED BY THE NEW YORK CITY TRANS-FAT BAN
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”150  This
2010] OF FAT PEOPLE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 875
151 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (discussing whether frequent
low altitude flights over owner’s property were for public use and the type of activity that
could constitute a “taking”); see also, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 126–29 (1978). New York City designated Grand Central Terminal to be a landmark.
Id. at 115. The owners of Grand Central Terminal had planned on building an office high rise
over the pre-existing station, but the landmark designation made that difficult. Id. at 116–17.
The Court discussed whether a landmark designation was the kind of public good or interest
typical in Takings Clause jurisprudence, and whether disallowing Penn Central from construct-
ing an office building which they had made architectural preparations to construct would
amount to a regulatory taking. Id. at 122.
153 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
154 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 (1984) (“Redistribution of fees
simple to correct deficiencies in the market determined by the state legislature to be attributable
to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the eminent domain power. Therefore, the Hawaii
statute must pass the scrutiny of the Public Use Clause.”).
155 Id. at 243–44; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
156 Compare Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (allowing the transfer of
land from one private owner to another in order to further economic development and benefits
to the community at large), with Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (explaining that
the over-regulation of private land can lessen the value and utility of that land to such an extent
that it is considered a “taking” and compensation to the owner is warranted).
157 See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240–44.
158 See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127 (1978) (“[A] state statute . . . may so frustrate dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘taking.’”); Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414–15.
159 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104.
160 See id. at 124–25.
161 Filosa, supra note 10, at 105.
162 Id.
constitutional right was extended to state and local governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment.151  Takings Clause jurisprudence requires that in order for a taking to be
valid it must be motivated or enacted for public use152 and just compensation must
be paid for the taking.153  Further, the Supreme Court has determined that taking prop-
erty for a broad, public purpose that accomplishes a legitimate state interest154 is the
functional equivalent of taking private property for “public use.”155
Takings can be both literal and regulatory.156  A literal or physical taking is the
condemnation of real property by the government.157  A regulatory taking, on the other
hand, occurs when the government, whether federal, state or local, enacts legislation
that diminishes the utility, value or profitability of land to such an extent that com-
pensation for the individual’s losses is just and appropriate.158
The Supreme Court articulated the framework for analyzing regulatory takings
in the case Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.159  In Penn Central,
the Court identified several factors to be analyzed in deciding whether a government
action amounted to a regulatory taking.160  The Court considered the “character of the
government action,”161 the economic repercussions of such an action,162 and the ex-
tent to which government actions affected the profit expectations of the business/land
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holder.163  Using the framework set forth in Penn Central and other leading cases, this
section will analyze whether the New York City trans-fat ban could be considered an
improper regulatory taking.
A. Character of Government Action
As previously discussed, the New York City trans-fat ban required restaurateurs
to stop serving foods containing trans-fats.164  Under Takings Clause analysis, one must
consider the character and scope of the actions taken165 by New York City against
restaurateurs and the government’s interest in taking such actions.166
The New York City trans-fat ban was justified under the rationale that trans-fats
cause heart disease.167  Heart disease is the leading cause of death among residents of
New York City.168  In analyzing the actions of New York City legislators, however,
courts will employ a balancing test between the interest being served by a regulation
and the implications a regulation has upon the group affected by it.169  Typically, if an
individual or an insular group of individuals bear a burden in order for the community
at large to incur some benefit, such a finding supports the notion that a regulatory
taking has occurred.170  That is certainly the case here: restaurateurs are the only group
affected by the city’s ban on trans-fats, even though grocers, farmers and wholesalers
are permitted to continue shelving and selling products containing trans-fats.171  Simi-
larly, there is no clear reason why New York City chose to enact an all-out ban on
trans-fats in restaurants, when most trans-fat regulations preceding the New York
City ban were tailored to simply alert consumers to the trans-fats contained in the
particular food item.172
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Drug Administration sought to achieve the same goals as New York City legislators, namely
a reduction in heart-disease-related deaths, however they took a more tempered approach than
New York’s complete ban on the preparation, sale, and consumption of trans-fats in restaurants.
173 See Filosa, supra note 10, at 106.
174 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
175 See Filosa, supra note 10, at 106, for a more in-depth discussion of the different ways
that New York City could have handled enacting a trans-fat regulatory scheme so as to avoid
issues with the fairness test inherent in Takings Clause analyses.
176 See id. at 107–09.
177 See id.
178 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137–38 (holding that the economic impact focus in a takings
analysis should not be solely on the loss of property value incurred, but should also take into
consideration the number and viability of remaining uses and options available to the aggrieved
party).
179 See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994), for the
court’s explanation concerning the economic impact felt by the owner of property or operator
of a business as a result of an applied regulatory scheme. The court explained that such
economic impact is “measured by the change, if any, in the fair market value caused by the
regulatory imposition.” Id.
The character of government action is evaluated, in the context of regulatory
takings, under a fairness rationale.173  Courts have not adopted “any ‘set formula’ for
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require . . . compensat[ion] by the govern-
ment.”174  In light of the foregoing factors and interests, and their similarities to lead-
ing regulatory takings cases, the New York City ban on trans-fats is likely improper
and runs afoul of the fairness-based takings test.  Had New York City either required
grocers, wholesalers and farmers to stop selling products with greater than one-half of
one gram of trans-fats or required restaurants to simply report on menus the trans-fats
contained in items being served, then the City would have applied their regulations
uniformly and fairly.175  Since the City did not apply their regulatory scheme equally
across all purveyors of food, excising a communal benefit from a very limited few, the
character and fairness of the regulation is questionable.
B. Economic Impact of Regulation
The economic impact of a regulation upon a group is another of the three elements
plumbed when analyzing a regulatory taking.176  Courts are concerned with the eco-
nomic loss incurred by a property holder or business owner after a regulation is put in
place limiting their ability to conduct business as usual.177  In determining the eco-
nomic impact a regulatory scheme has had upon a business, courts generally consider
whether and to what extent normal business purposes have been retained by the owner
despite new regulations,178 and additionally, to what extent the profitability of a busi-
ness has been damaged as a result of regulatory schemes.179  Generally, in order for a
court to rule that a taking has occurred, there must be a severe reduction in the value
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180 See Filosa, supra note 10, at 107 n.81 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104 (stating that
a change in the value of a property from $75,000 to $25,000 did not constitute loss of an
economically viable use)).
181 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that an individual
must suffer from a complete or an almost complete loss of viable usage in order to successfully
argue that a regulatory taking has occurred).
182 See Jennifer Davies, Starbucks to Eliminate Trans Fat From Baked Goods, Pastries,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 3, 2007, at A1 (explaining that a 35 pound tub of trans-fat cook-
ing oil costs approximately $25 and has a fry yield equivalent to 4,000 orders of McDonald’s
medium french fries, and that switching to trans-fat free oil would cost approximately $10
more per unit for the same yield); see also Russell Berman, Ban on Trans Fat in Restaurants
Is Approved by New York City, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 6, 2006, at 1; Tom Stroozas, Trans Fats and
Your Restaurant, Gas Foodservice Equipment Network, http://www.gfen.info/pdf/articles/
cookinggas0907.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
183 See Davies, supra note 182; Brad Johnson, The World According to French Fries,
RESTAURANTS & INSTITUTIONS, July 15, 1997 (stating that in 1997 McDonald’s USA went
through 2.4 billion pounds of potatoes, accounting for 7% of the total national crop); American
Heart Association, supra note 11; U.S. Food & Drug Administration, supra note 19; see also
CalorieCount.com, Food Details: Medium McDonald’s French Fries, http://caloriecount.about
.com/calories-mcdonalds-medium-french-fries-i53928 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (stating
that a medium order of McDonald’s french fries weighs 117 grams, or .258 pounds). Based on
these facts, McDonald’s sells approximately 9.6 billion orders of medium french fries per
year. Switching to trans-fat free oil increases the overhead costs of McDonald’s production at
a rate of $10 per 4,000 orders of medium fries. In the aggregate then, the switch to trans-fat free
oil (not including adjustments to frying equipment) for french fries alone would cost
McDonald’s $23,904,382 per year.
184 See American Heart Association, supra note 11; U.S. Food & Drug Administration,
supra note 19.
185 See Stroozas, supra note 182.
186 See Davies, supra note 182; see also supra note 180 and accompanying text.
187 See Eating L.A., Will the Trans Fat Ban Hurt Ethnic Restaurants?, http://eatingla
.blogspot.com/2008/07/will-trans-fat-ban-hurt-ethnic.html (July 26, 2008).
of the property in question180 or few viable uses left for the property or business in
light of the imposed regulations.181
Restaurateurs in New York City have a strong argument that their businesses have
become less profitable as a result of the trans-fat regulations and, in some cases, that
they have been effectively deprived of most or all viable uses for their property.  Oper-
ating under the economic loss theory, restaurateurs have suffered considerable losses
as a result of the trans-fat ban.182  Trans-fats are admittedly much cheaper183 than their
non-hydrogenated counterparts and are less perishable.184  The switch to trans-fat free
oils, and in some cases, trans-fat reducing fryers,185 is a costly endeavor for nation-
wide fast food chains,186 and a veritable death sentence for small local restaurants
and diners.187
Similarly, New York restaurateurs have a strong argument that the trans-fat ban
amounts to a regulatory taking under the viable use rationale.  If a property is zoned
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188 New York City has extremely complicated and strict zoning laws. Commercial activities
are only permitted in certain districts, and within those districts strict limitations are placed
on the size and nature of the commercial activities conducted by a given business. Use of a
commercial property as a restaurant is not use permitted as of right, but rather it requires a
special permit to be issued by the City. See ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
art. III, ch.2 (2006).
189 See Filosa, supra note 10, at 108–09 for an expanded articulation of this argument.
190 See id. at 108.
191 Id. at 109.
192 See generally RestaurantOwner.com, Industry Survey: How Much Does It Cost To
Open A Restaurant?, http://www.restaurantowner.com/public/811.cfm (last visited Feb. 26,
2010). Study data suggests that the average cost of starting up a restaurant ranges between
$125,000 and $550,000, not including the costs associated with land or storefront purchase.
Id. These costs, however, are based on data from across the nation. Id. As New York City real
estate is wildly more expensive than real estate in most other areas of the country, New York
City restaurateurs pay even greater costs for real estate on top of these basic start-up costs.
193 See, e.g., Apollo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
194 See Filosa, supra note 10, at 111 (citing Apollo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1349).
195 Id. at 110 (expounding on the third Apollo Fuels factor, i.e., whether the claimant could
to operate as a restaurant,188 and the restaurant can no longer economically subsist
under the trans-fat ban, then all of the viable economic uses for which that property
has been zoned have been extinguished.189  Following the holding in Penn Central,
such a set of circumstances would amount to a loss of viable use,190 as a building
zoned exclusively for purposes of operating a (defunct, post-trans-fat ban) restaurant
could not be used for other purposes.
C. Investment Expectation of the Owner/Operator
The third prong of the Takings Clause inquiry revolves around the rule that a
regulatory action may be “deemed a taking if the regulation interferes with the land-
owner’s distinct reasonable investment-backed expectations.”191  In common sense
terms, it is clear that restaurateurs invest great amounts of capital opening and devel-
oping their restaurants and that they do so in hopes that they will turn a profit.192  A
court considers three factors when determining whether a landowner’s investment
expectations have been frustrated: (1) whether the industry an owner of land engaged
in is highly regulated; (2) whether the owner was aware of the issues that the regu-
lations in question sought to correct when they purchased the property in question;
(3) whether it was reasonably foreseeable that regulations might inhere to the pur-
chased property at the time the purchase was being considered.193  There are policy
rationales and principles of law motivating these three factors.  First, courts are less apt
to find a regulatory taking when land is used in an industry that is already highly regu-
lated.194  This makes logical sense—if someone enters into a business that is closely
scrutinized by the government, it is foreseeable that a regulation could be enacted that
would impinge upon his or her business model.195  Second, courts are less likely to find
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have “reasonably anticipated” the possibility of regulation).
196 Id.
197 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Retail Food Protection: A Cooperative Program, http://
www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/RetailFoodProtection/default.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
198 See supra note 97.
199 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
200 Thomas J. Lueck, City Plans to Place Sharp Limits on Restaurants’ Use of Trans Fats,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at A1.
201 Lueck & Severson, supra note 44.
a regulatory taking if an individual purchased a piece of property aware that complicat-
ing regulations would likely be imposed on the property in the foreseeable future.196
In New York City, restaurateurs would have a very persuasive argument that their
investment-backed expectations were frustrated by the trans-fat ban.  The restaurant
industry is regulated to a certain degree by the Food and Drug Administration and by
local health inspection agencies.197  “Culinary censorship” such as that contained in
the trans-fat ban, however, was unheard of until the New York City trans-fat proposal.
The Food and Drug Administration issues many regulations requiring basic safety and
cleanliness in the preparation and packaging of foods, however the Food and Drug
Administration has never made a practice of singling out specific, common foods
and strictly regulating them.198
The second prong of the investment-expectation analysis requires speculation
and conjecture; one cannot say with certainty whether a particular restaurant would
satisfy that prong.  That being said, certainly some restaurateurs in New York pur-
chased a building with the expectation of starting a profitable restaurant, unaware
of the desire of New York legislators to enact a trans-fat ban unprecedented in scope
and forcefulness.  Surely, this was the case for numerous restaurateurs in New York,
and although the claims of individual restaurants would have to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis, many New York restaurants would meet this requirement.
Finally, the third prong of the investment-backed expectations analysis requires
that the regulatory action complained of was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the
aggrieved individual purchased their property.199  Most New York City restaurateurs,
excepting those who purchased restaurants after the trans-fat ban proposal, would have
no difficulty satisfying the third prong of the analysis.  No city had approved a trans-fat
ban ahead of New York City.200  Though the FDA had required labeling of trans-fats
for several years before the trans-fat ban, no government took restrictive, as opposed
to advisory, actions against trans-fats.201
D. Takings Clause Conclusion
Restaurant owners in New York City have a strong argument that a regulatory
taking occurred when New York City banned trans-fats from its restaurants.  First, the
character of New York City’s trans-fat ban is suspect.  The City of New York forced
restaurateurs to single-handedly bear the burden of eliminating trans-fats for a professed
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203 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 182.
204 See Filosa, supra note 10, at 104; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 182.
206 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
207 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
208 See generally RestaurantOwner.com, supra note 192.
209 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
210 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
211 Lucek & Severson, supra note 44. Note that it is customary for municipalities to ensure
basic care in preparation of food through the use of restaurant inspections. Again, however, New
York City’s approach was novel in regulating the types of foods served in restaurants. Id.
212 Id.
213 See supra Part I.B.
public purpose.202  The City did not force supermarkets or wholesalers to stop selling
groceries with trans-fats; they enacted regulations against one particular group in
hopes of achieving their goals.  Second, restaurants in New York were economically
damaged by the trans-fat ban.203  The costs of switching to trans-fat free products is
high—especially for the small, independent restaurateur.204  Making that switch, how-
ever, has hurt the bottom lines of every restaurant subject to the ban.205  While many
restaurants can still continue their business after enactment of the ban, restaurants that
are no longer operable as a result of the trans-fat ban and are zoned purely for use
as a restaurant have little or no viable use.  Businesses that are severely economi-
cally damaged or have few viable uses left as a result of regulatory actions have been
“taken” within the meaning of the Takings Clause.206  Finally, the investment-backed
expectations of New York restaurateurs were clearly frustrated by the trans-fat ban.207
Startup costs are very high for restaurants,208 and restaurateurs obviously want to turn
a profit.  New York City restaurant owners put in large amounts of capital to operate
successful businesses.  The restaurant owners affected by the ban were not operating
in a strict regulatory climate.209  Restaurants are monitored by local health inspectors
and foods are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.210  A local municipality,
however, had never dictated to restaurants what they could serve their patrons before
2006—and New York City sparked considerable outrage when it did so.211  New York
restaurants were not operating in a highly regulated climate, nor did the vast majority
of restaurateurs have reason to know of any pending motions to introduce the trans-
fat ban.  Further, a total ban on trans-fat was not, prior to the New York City proposal,
a likely or foreseeable economic development.212  Under standard Takings Clause
analysis, laid out in this section, it is clear that the rights of New York’s restaurant
owners were likely violated by New York’s trans-fat ban.
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION: OF FAT PEOPLE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
There is no question that trans-fats pose health risks for those who consume
them;213 science and common sense both caution against ingesting such harmful foods
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in quantity.  The negative effects of engaging in risky dietary behaviors, however,
are risks that every individual must weigh independent of governmental intrusion.
Government, at any level, is ill-equipped to make health decisions for its citizens; that
it might force its judgment upon the people is a troubling and ridiculous notion.
Thankfully, American jurisprudence has developed prudently, its creators always
mindful that troubling and ridiculous notions arise and are sometimes advocated.
To that end, constitutional safeguards were put in place and have developed through
case law to protect us as a nation from ourselves.  The New York trans-fat ban, con-
sidered to be a troubling and ridiculous regulation by many, impinges upon several
core constitutional principles, put in place to limit the authority of government over
the people.  The trans-fat ban violates the substantive due process rights of New
Yorkers who have a liberty interest in their right to privacy and their right to make
health-related decisions free from the long arm of the state.  The ban also constitutes
an improper regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, which guarantees that citi-
zens will not be unreasonably stripped of their property without just compensation
from the government.
The New York City trans-fat ban and its progeny in Philadelphia, California,
Boston, and Montgomery County, Maryland, hollow out traditional American notions
of individualism and autonomy.  Such natural law principles have inspired the legal
and social mores of our nation since time immemorial, and must be safeguarded as
the sacred, democratic pillars they are.
